STATE CAPTURE INDEX
2025. year

B&H shows clear elements of state capture, in which political clientelism undermines democracy, responsibility and management of public resources.

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KEY FINDINGS

State capture in B&H has systemic and multidimensional elements, through rooted political clientelism as a key form of manifestation. Political parties – the key generator of state capture, exercise effective control over the distribution of public resources, thus relativizing the functionality of the key mechanism of political responsibility – the electoral process.

The decision-making process is essentially non-inclusive, without a foundation in a strategic approach and to a very limited extent supported by indicators, and often represents a mere formal procedural framework for the transmission of particular interests of political parties into formal decisions.

The dominance of political parties is strongly manifested through the instrumentalization and dysfunctionality of the accountability system, making it impossible to prevent, detect and sanction abuses, making impunity widespread.

Overall, B&H functions as a hybrid regime in which democratic forms and mechanisms of responsibility are formally established, but the functioning of all four dimensions – the democratic process, the decision-making process, the system of responsibility and the distribution of public resources – is strongly conditioned by particular interests.

Summary of Key State Capture Indicators Key findings: Expert Panel

DEMOCRATIC PROCESS DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ECO SYSTEM OF RESPONSIBILITY DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

RATING: 2

Summary finding: The democratic process in BiH is contaminated by the predominant power of political parties, which is strongly manifested through the dysfunctionality of the key mechanism of political responsibility – elections.

Media pluralism and the role of civil society are significantly relativized by the unfavorable environment in which they operate, which is shaped to a significant extent by the particular interests of political parties and actors under their effective control.

The democratic framework is formal, but real competition is significantly relativized and political accountability is limited.

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

RATING: 2,5

Summary finding: Inappropriate influence of political parties on the decision-making process leads to a neglect of the strategic approach, lack of evidence-based approaches, limited inclusiveness and lack of oversight.

Institutional decision-making processes often boil down to the formal confirmation of previously reached arrangements.

The dominance of the executive over the legislature undermines both horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms.

ECO SYSTEM OF RESPONSIBILITY

RATING: 2,5

Summary finding: Overall, the responsibility system shows numerous symptoms of dysfunctionality, which significantly relativizes the realization of its purpose.

The accountability system in BiH exists formally, but not in substance.

Institutions of supervision, audit, judiciary and police act selectively and under political influence.

Weak control and impunity perpetuate corruption.

The eco system of responsibility does not function as a mechanism for protecting the public interest.

DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

RATING: 1,5

Summary finding: Distribution of public resources is a key manifestation of political influence and state capture.

Public procurement, concessions and employment in the public sector based on cronyism and clientelism serve vested interests aimed at preserving power and illegal enrichment.

Transparency and competition are minimal, and control mechanisms are insufficient.

This practice deepens economic inequalities and undermines reforms.

METHODOLOGY

This methodological framework draws on the comprehensive definition of state capture proposed by Elizabeth Dávid-Barrett, which understands state capture as a form of systemic corruption where narrow interest groups assume control over public institutions and the processes of policymaking and implementation.

By doing so, they subordinate the public interest to their own particular goals.

The conceptual basis also relies on the Measuring State Capture report of the International Anti-Corruption Academy, which reviews existing approaches to assessing this phenomenon and analyzes their strengths and limitations, as well as on the work of Daniel Kaufmann, who developed the global composite State Capture Index.

The methodology combines quantitative indicators (statistical and budgetary data, legislation, investigations, court rulings, governance and corruption indices) and qualitative insights (expert panel), in order to document and explain how political clientelism enables systemic state capture.

The focus is on identifying whether public or particular interests prevail within the functioning of the system, and on mapping clientelist patterns that secure power reproduction: granting access to public resources in exchange for loyalty (quid pro quo), while clientelist distortion of accountability mechanisms ensures impunity.

The underlying hypothesis is that state capture primarily unfolds through mechanisms of political clientelism, allowing political actors to instrumentalize entrusted public power and resources to reproduce authority and expand networks of loyal clients.

Methodology Methodological Framework